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 This case note is an analysis of Numsa obo Members v 
Elements Six Productions (Pty) Ltd [2017] ZALCJHB 35 (7 
February 2017). The jurisprudence advanced in this case is 
pertinent to balancing the employer and employee’s rights in the 
context of collective bargaining. The worker’s right to strike is 
one of the rights entrenched in the South African constitution. In 
addition, this right to strike should not be directly or indirectly 
undermined without a just cause. The preamble of the South 
African Constitution seeks to redress the unjust laws of the past 
including those in the employment arena. Furthermore, unfair 
discrimination is also one of the prohibited practices which are 
sanctioned not only domestically but internationally as well in 
terms of the International Labour Conventions. This note 
contributes to the existing literature of labour law by critically 
analysing the decision reached by Tlhotlhalemaje J. 
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1  Introduction 
Does offering bonuses to non-striking employees who went beyond the call 
of duty and performed the duties of the striking employees contravene 
section 5 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA)? How compelling is 
the contention that the employer is simply rewarding volunteers for their 
efforts in ensuring that it fulfils clients' demands during a crippling strike? 
More accurately, what is significant here is that without non-strikers going 
the extra mile, the employer would have lost market share as well as 
suffering reputational damage. From a different perspective, can it be 
argued that the interests of the employer in safeguarding the viability of the 
enterprise override concerns about the disproportionate treatment of 
striking employees? 
The objections lodged by the striking employees and their union about the 
extra payment made to non-strikers are important. At the core of the 
objections is the likely detrimental effect on future strikes, as striking 
employees would be dissuaded from joining strikes based on the lure of 
reward. To this should be added that the practice has the effect of 
weakening the employees' collective bargaining effort, or even of sowing 
discord and disunity among members of a union and a workforce in general. 
In this sense, additional payments undermine the right to strike and 
invariably tilt the scales of power in favour of the employer. There is also the 
free-rider problem: if the striking employees' demands are met, the non-
striking employees who are within the bargaining component and who had 
performed the tasks of those on strike in addition to their own would end up 
benefitting twice. Firstly, the non-strikers would receive salary increments 
as a result of the sacrifices made by their colleagues, and secondly, they 
would recieve an extra income derived from the strike action. 
This paper engages with these difficult and interesting questions against the 
backdrop of NUMSA obo Members v Elements Six Productions (Pty) Ltd.1 
It also reflects on the conundrum created by the lacuna in the LRA left 
unattended despite recent amendments. This is also underlined by a related 
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1  NUMSA obo Members v Elements Six Productions (Pty) Ltd 2017 ZALCJHB 35 (7 
February 2017) (hereinafter referred to as Elements Six Productions). 
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pronouncement in NUM v Namakwa Sands (A Division of Anglo American 
Corporation Ltd).2 
2  The facts in Element Six Productions 
Since the foundational cases of CWIU v BP SA3 and OK Bazaars (1929) 
Ltd v SACCAWU,4 recourse by employers to defeat a protected strike by 
paying inducements, incentives or bonuses to non-strikers, though 
characterised as "innocent" rewards for "hard work", has been and still is a 
valid ground for litigation. The facts of Elements Six Production were 
straightforward. Members of NUMSA, UASA and SAEWA had embarked 
upon a protected strike in pursuit of their wage demands. As was to be 
expected, not all employees joined the protected strike. During the strike 
some of the non-striking employees performed extra duties, thereby 
enabling the employer to sustain production at a level sufficient to meet 
clients' demands. In appreciation of the non-striking employees' efforts in 
going the extra mile, the employer decided to pay them an additional sum 
termed "a token of appreciation".5 In the aftermath of the strike, the striking 
employees were naturally aggrieved by the selective payment of the 
bonuses. It was this dispute over the payment of bonuses to non-strikers 
that found its way to the Labour Court. 
The core issue before the Labour Court was whether the payment of 
bonuses to the non-strikers amounted to unfair discrimination against the 
striking employees. It was contended by the applicants that rewarding the 
non-strikers discriminated against the striking employees for exercising a 
right contemplated by the LRA in terms of section 5(1) of that Act, or 
constituted the provision of a prohibited advantage or promise of advantage 
to a person not utilising any right granted by the Act or for not engaging in 
any proceedings in terms of the Act as contemplated by section 5(3). On 
the other hand, the respondent retorted that it had not breached the 
provisions of section 5 and its payments were not discriminatory on any 
specified or unspecified ground.6 The employer's second line of defence 
was that the criteria it had applied in making the payments were objective 
and rational and did not result in any corrosive effect on future strikes.7 
                                            
2  NUM v Namakwa Sands (A Division of Anglo American Corporation Ltd) 2008 29 ILJ 
698 (LC) (hereinafter referred to as Namakwa Sands). 
3  CWIU v BP SA 1991 12 ILJ 599 (IC). 
4  OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v SACCAWU 1993 14 ILJ 362 (LAC). 
5  Elements Six Productions para 3.3. 
6  Elements Six Productions para 4. 
7  Elements Six Productions paras 4, 10.9. 
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2.1  The labour court judgment 
The court ruled that the payment of the "token" to the non-striking 
employees constituted differentiation, which amounted to discrimination 
within the context of section 5(1), 5(2)(c)(iii) and 5(2)(c)(vi) of the LRA,8 and 
that the discrimination was unfair in that the striking employees were 
prejudiced for their participation in the lawful activities of their trade union, 
and the exercise of their right to strike. A declaratory order was made 
prohibiting the employer from ever again engaging in such an activity. The 
reasons advanced by Tlhotlhalemaje J for concluding that the employer had 
engaged in conduct prohibited by both subsections 5(1) and 5(3) and for 
making the declaratory order merit detailed analysis. 
3 The lacuna 
The labour court’s decision recapitulates the reasons why tokens of 
appreciation are not to be paid to non-striking employees. There is no doubt 
that non-striking employees cannot be forced by their employers to do the 
task of striking employees. However, the LRA is silent on whether an 
employer can politely request non-striking employees to voluntarily perform 
such tasks. There is nothing in the LRA or any other statutory provision that 
prohibits an employer from utilising the services of its non-striking 
employees to perform work ordinarily performed by striking employees, and 
rewarding them for going the "extra mile".9 In addition, no consequences 
are visited upon an employer that has politely asked non-strikers to 
volunteer to perform work ordinarily performed by striking employees.10 It is 
unlikely that the court would prohibit the payment of "tokens" for work done 
during an unprotected strike, given the fact that there is no lawful right to 
strike that requires protection. Furthermore, the provision of section 10 of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act11 escaped the attention of the 
drafters during its recent amendment in regard to these vexed issues. 
Although consensual overtime work is allowed, section 10 of the BCEA does 
not address the issue whether such overtime work may include work 
ordinarily performed by striking employees.12 
                                            
8  Elements Six Productions para 23.12. 
9  Elements Six Productions para 16. 
10  Elements Six Productions para 17. 
11  Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as BCEA). 
12  Elements Six Productions para 18.8. 
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4  The constitutional and statutory context 
In any discussion of the complex issue of discrimination in employment, the 
starting point is to look at the constitutional and statutory context. In that 
regard it is important to appreciate the trilogy of rights: the right to freedom 
of association,13 the right to engage in collective bargaining14 and the right 
to strike.15 The LRA sets out to amplify the said fundamental right of freedom 
of association.16 At the core of the LRA's guarantee of the fundamental right 
of freedom of association is the right of every employee to take part in the 
formation of a trade union and to become a member of a trade union.17 A 
corollary of trade union membership is the right to participate in lawful 
activities of the union.18 This brings to the fore the pivotal provisions of 
section 5(1) and 5(3), which read as follows: 
(1)  No person may discriminate against an employee for exercising any 
right conferred by this Act… 
(3)  No person may advantage, or promise to advantage, an employee or 
a person seeking employment for that person not exercising any right 
conferred by this Act for not participating in any proceedings in terms 
of this Act. However, nothing in this section precludes the parties to a 
dispute from concluding an agreement to settle that dispute. 
Freedom of association is further buttressed by section 187 of the LRA 
concerning automatically unfair dismissals. Section 187(1)(a) of the LRA 
provides that: 
A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, 
acts contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is (a) that the 
employee participated in or supported, or indicated an intention to participate 
in or support, a strike or protest action that complies with the provisions of 
Chapter IV. 
                                            
13  Section18 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Constitution) provides: "Everyone has the right to freedom of 
association." 
14  Section 23(5) of the Constitution provides: "Every trade union, employers' 
organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. National 
legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the 
legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 
36(1)." 
15  Section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
16  Sections 4-10 of the Constitution. 
17  Section 4(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 
LRA). 
18  Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd 2005 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC). 
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As per the above provision, to dismiss an employee for joining or 
participating in the affairs of a union is therefore automatically unfair.  
The endorsement of trade union rights in the Constitution19 and the LRA20 
essentially provides for strong protection of the rights of employees.21 A 
trade union can be described as the in-between body that bridges the gap 
between an employer and an employee.22 Essentially the role of a trade 
union is to safeguard the existing rights of its members and also to improve 
and enhance these rights.23 All employees are entitled to join and participate 
in trade union activities.24 Therefore, trade unions are essential to the 
furtherance of the concepts of equality and democracy in the workplace as 
they promote the interests of employees by ensuring that employees are 
placed in a position equal to that of their employers.25 
The court's enforcement of the LRA's dispute resolution framework is further 
illustrated in Mackay v ABSA Group,26 where the court stated that:  
All disputes arising from the employer-employee relationship must be 
effectively resolved. Such disputes are resolved through conciliation, 
arbitration and adjudication, and those of a collective nature through collective 
bargaining. It is clear that it could never have been intended that some 
disputes arising out of the employer-employee relationship are incapable of 
resolution in terms of the Act.27 
The court averred that the labour dispute resolution framework is deemed 
effective in protecting the rights of employees.28 Furthermore, the protection 
of employees' rights is enforced through the process of collective bargaining 
within the dispute resolution system.29 In National Police Services Union v 
National Negotiating Forum,30 the court pointed out that the LRA does not 
place any duty on either the employer or the employee to engage in the 
bargaining process. The courts are not given authority to determine or 
influence the result of the bargaining process. The outcome of such 
                                            
19  Section 23(2) of the Constitution. 
20  Section 65 of the LRA. 
21  Botes 2013 PELJ 525. 
22  Sundar 2007 Indian J Ind Relat 713. Also see Grawitzky Collective Bargaining in 
Times of Crisis 1. 
23  Sundar 2007 Indian J Ind Relat 714. 
24  Grogan Collective Labour Law 34. 
25  Finnemore and Van Rensburg Contemporary Labour Relations 139. 
26  Mackay v ABSA Group 1999 12 BLLR 1317 (LC) (hereinafter referred to as Mackay). 
27  Mackay para 15. 
28  Mackay para 15. 
29  Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 30. 
30  National Police Services Union v National Negotiating Forum 1999 20 ILJ 1081 (LC) 
(hereinafter referred to as National Negotiating Forum).  
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negotiations is entirely dependent on the parties themselves.31 This ruling 
essentially portrays that both parties to the bargaining process must be 
given equal power to ensure that there is democracy in labour relations.32 
It is undisputed that the balance of power in employment relationships 
favours employers over employees, so strikes are used as tools by 
employees to bring some sort of balance.33 Botha34 argues that a refusal to 
work grants employees a significant voice regarding what goes on in the 
workplace. Similarly, Estreicher35 expresses the opinion that "without the 
right to strike, collective bargaining becomes collective begging". In the 
same spirit, Chicktay36 advances that a strike action enables employees to 
preserve their dignity by showing the employer that they are "not just cogs 
in a machine". In addition, the Constitution entrenches the right of workers 
to go on strike.37 The right to strike is recognised not only domestically but 
also through International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions such as 
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise38 and 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining,39 which advocate for the 
protection of workers' rights. 
4.1  Did the discrimination amount to unfair discrimination 
In Elements Six Productions it was shown that there was a high demand for 
the employer's products and in order to meet the demands of the clients 
during the looming strike, the employer had to increase overtime shifts, for 
which employees were remunerated.40 The employers contended that the 
firm’s stocks had almost depleted whilst the demand for the firm’s products 
continued; hence the need to come up with measures to continue with 
production in order to meet the demands of the firm’s clients.41 The 
questions dealt with in Elements Six Productions were: how realistic is it that 
employees would have assisted the employer voluntarily without the 
inducement or incentive of financial gain?42 And would ordinary non-striking 
                                            
31  National Negotiating Forum para 52. 
32  Du Toit 1997 LDD 42. 
33  Manamela and Budeli 2013 CILSA 323. See also Myburgh 2013 CLL 1. 
34  Botha 2015 De Jure 332. 
35  Estreicher 1994 Mich L Rev 578. 
36  Chicktay 2006 Obiter 348. 
37  Section 23(2) of the Constitution. Also see s 64 of the LRA. 
38  Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 87 
(1948). 
39  Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 98 (1949).  
40  Elements Six Productions para 10.2. 
41  Elements Six Productions para 10.5. 
42  Elements Six Productions paras 6, 10.6. 
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employees volunteer to perform the tasks of striking employees without an 
expectation of some form of reward?43 This article agrees with the court's 
finding that employees would be unlikely to volunteer to save the business 
of an employer without the expectation of a reward. 
Furthermore, in Elements Six Productions it was shown that the striking 
employees felt that they had lost out by going on strike, as they had not 
been given the token and were also not paid for the duration of the strike. 
The employees were also concerned about the fact that the non-strikers 
benefitted from the increase in wages attained as a result of the strike 
action, and the employer had therefore discriminated against the striking 
employees by not paying them the token too.44 The employees in Elements 
Six Productions argued that in the case of FAWU v Pets Products, once it 
had been established that there was discrimination against employees for 
exercising a right conferred in the LRA, it was presumed that the 
discrimination was unfair until the contrary had been established.45 
The employers argued to the contrary that the courts in FAWU and NUM v 
Namakwa Sands46 erred in concluding that discrimination against 
employees for striking was discrimination on a listed ground. This was so in 
that striking was not listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic, 
and the court in Namakwa Sands had not conceded that striking was a listed 
ground of discrimination.47 It was further contended that if the employer's 
motive is not to unfairly discriminate, then the discriminatory conduct 
complained of cannot be seen as unfair.48 More so, if an employer can show 
that there were rational and objective criteria for the payment of the bonus, 
the employer is justified in making such discrimination.49 What was 
worrisome about the employer's arguments, though, was that they refused 
to disclose the payments made to the non-strikers, which suggested that 
the transparency of the "rational and objective criteria" used was 
questionable.  
The court referred to the case of Mbana v Shepstone & Wylie,50 where the 
Constitutional Court held that within the context of employment law the test 
                                            
43  Elements Six Productions para 18.1. 
44  Elements Six Productions para 8.4. 
45  Elements Six Productions para 14.4. 
46  NUM v Namakwa Sands (A Division of Anglo American Corporation Ltd) 2008 29 ILJ 
698 (LC). 
47  Elements Six Productions para 15.1. 
48  Elements Six Productions para 15.2. 
49  Elements Six Productions para 15.3. 
50  Mbana v Shepstone & Wylie 2015 36 ILJ 1805 (CC). 
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for unfair discrimination is commensurate to that laid down in Harksen v 
Lane.51 The initial step is to establish whether the employer's policy 
differentiates between employees. The second step entails establishing 
whether that differentiation amounts to discrimination, and the third step 
involves determining whether the discrimination is unfair.52 
Tlhotlhalemaje J observed that the employees had discharged the onus 
placed on them by demonstrating that there had indeed been differentiation 
which amounted to discrimination, and that in return the employer had not 
been able to demonstrate that its conduct had not infringed on the rights of 
the employees as they had contended, nor had it demonstrated that the 
discrimination was fair.53 Tlhotlhalemaje J further observed that it was very 
unlikely that employees would volunteer to work shifts without an 
expectation of a reward.54 More so, the veil of secrecy surrounding these 
payments led to an inference that they were not made merely as a token. 
4.2 Undermining the Holy Cow of collective bargaining 
In terms of what transpired in Elements Six Productions there is a great 
likelihood of employers gaining the upper hand and turning collective 
bargaining into collective begging. In future, no employees will heed the call 
to go on strike, and this indirectly limits the constitutional right to strike. In 
addition, the practice of awarding bonuses only to non-striking employees 
has the effect of weakening the employees' collective bargaining effort, or 
at least of causing discord and disunity amongst the members of a union, 
thus undermining the right to strike and invariably tilting the scales of the 
power play in favour of the employer.55 In a similar vein, when non-striking 
employees perform the tasks of striking employees, it means employers can 
continue with a “business as usual” attitude. Such practices can be used as 
a strategy by employers to negate and dilute the intended effects of the 
protected strike action embarked upon by employees.56 This undoubtedly 
degrades the status of collective bargaining as a constitutional tool to 
resolve disputes; it defeats the purpose of the LRA as identified in its section 
                                            
51  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. 
52  Mbana v Shepstone & Wylie 2015 36 ILJ 1805 (CC) para 26. Also see Sali v National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service 2014 ZACC 19 (19 June 2014) 
para 9. 
53  Elements Six Productions para 23. 
54  Elements Six Productions para 23.6. 
55  Elements Six Productions para 18.4. 
56  Elements Six Productions para 18.6. 
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1; and undermines the rights of employees to freely associate and take part 
in the lawful activities of their unions.57  
Non-striking employees who are asked to perform the tasks of those on 
strike in addition to their normal tasks could view this as an opportunity to 
supplement their salaries during the duration of the strike. This could induce 
them to refrain from joining strike actions, or to abandon the strike midway, 
or to be deterred from taking part in strike action in future.58 Additionally, the 
exercise of a right to strike with a view to advancing and addressing 
employees' legitimate concerns might be rendered ineffective, if not 
nugatory. In the alternative, if in the end the striking employees' demands 
are met, the non-striking employees who fall within the bargaining unit and 
who had performed the tasks of those on strike in addition to their own would 
end up benefitting twice, that is, from an increase in salary as a result of the 
sacrifices made by their colleagues, and from extra income derived from the 
strike action. This clearly cannot be a fair labour practice.59 
The consequences that flow from such disunity may be dire for non-striking 
employees, given the common knowledge that strikes normally tend to turn 
violent at or near workplaces. "It is not uncommon for strike violence to spiral 
into communities and the courts would be remiss and imprudent in not 
acknowledging these far-reaching consequences".60 For example, in the 
case of Transnet SOC Ltd v SATAWU,61 "a non-striking truck driver lost his 
life after a brick was thrown at his truck and hit him on the head".62 In 
addition, in SATAWU v Ram Transport South Africa (Pty) Ltd,63 employees 
participating in a protected strike threatened replacement employees in 
terms of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA with sticks and forced them to vacate 
the workplace. 
The function of collective bargaining is to ensure that parties come to an 
understanding about the issue in dispute and that the dispute will not 
necessitate industrial action or lock-outs to reach a resolution.64 This would 
benefit both the employer and the employee in that the employer would save 
on production time lost and the employee would not forfeit the right to be 
                                            
57  Elements Six Productions para 18.7. 
58  Elements Six Productions para 18.2. 
59  Elements Six Productions para 18.3. 
60  Elements Six Productions para 18.5. 
61  Transnet SOC Ltd v SATAWU 2012 ZALCJHB 107 (12 October 2012). 
62  Transnet SOC Ltd para 2. 
63  SATAWU v Ram Transport South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2014 ZALCJHB 471 (26 November 
2014). 
64  Macsteel (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1990 11 ILJ 995 (LAC).  
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paid. In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v NCBAWU,65 the 
court stated that the LRA must be interpreted in conformity with international 
law and the Constitution.66 It must be understood that the Constitution was 
enacted to redress the injustices of the past, not only in society but also in 
the field of labour. It is for this reason that the LRA has the dual function of 
inculcating transformation in the workplace as well as in society at large, 
because an injustice to an employee at a workplace adversely affects his 
family and the community in which he resides. 
In Foodgro (A division of Leisurenet Ltd v Keil),67 the Labour Appeal Court 
acknowledged that unjust laws that govern society negatively impact on 
labour relations.68 In addition, labour peace essentially entails the 
elimination of strife which takes the form of strikes and lock-outs. By 
engaging in collective bargaining, parties would be able to resolve disputes 
amicably and speedily rather than having to resort to strikes and lock-outs.69 
This, in turn, would result in a decrease of work days lost and greater 
productivity.70 
4.3 The Sword of Damocles71 
Granted that an employer is statutorily prohibited from using economic 
incentives to defeat a protected strike, does that mean an employer is 
prevented from taking measures aimed at ensuring the viability of its 
business? It bears repeating that strikes are intended to cause financial 
loss.72 A careful reading of the strike provision indicates that the answer is 
no. This is because section 67(5) provides an escape route in the face of a 
crippling protected strike. Even in the context of a protected strike, an 
employer still possesses the ultimate weapon of last resort under section 
67(5). If it can be proved that the economic harm caused by an industrial 
action has become unbearable, the dismissal of the protected strikers on 
the grounds of operational requirements73 may be justifiable. Put simply, 
                                            
65  Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v NCBAWU 1997 6 BLLR 697 (LAC). 
66  Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v NCBAWU 1997 6 BLLR 697 (LAC) 
para 70. 
67  Foodgro (A Division of Leisurenet Ltd) v Keil 1999 9 BLLR 875 (LAC). 
68  Desai and Habib 1997 JMAS 495. 
69  Pep Stores (Pty) Ltd v Laka 1998 19 ILJ 1534 (LC). 
70  Daemane 2014 JETEMS 122.  
71  The Sword of Damocles means any impending danger and, in this case, if an 
employer suffers financial loss due to a prolonged strike, employees risk being 
dismissed in terms of operational requirements. Also see Collins English Dictionary 
2018 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/sword-of-damocles. 
72  Metsimaholo Local Municipality v SAMWU 2016 ZALAC 19 (11 May 2016) para 27. 
73  Section 189(1) of the LRA, "when an employer contemplates dismissing one or more 
employees for reasons based on the employer‘s operational requirements, the 
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dismissal becomes a weapon only in exceptional circumstances, when 
operational requirements dictate its use.74 
The LRA recognises that an employer may dismiss employees if the 
operational requirements of its business make such a dismissal 
unavoidable.75 This is supported by the recent case of SATAWU v G4S 
Aviation Secure Solutions.76 Section 213 of the LRA defines operational 
requirement as one based on "the economic, technological, structural or 
similar needs of the employer". However, failure by the employer to prove 
that the reason for the dismissal is fair and is based on the employer's 
operational requirements will result in the dismissal’s failing the substantive 
test.77 Courts will uphold a dismissal as fair only where it was both 
substantively and procedurally fair.78 Du Toit79 argues that "a fair reason for 
dismissal is not limited to efforts to save a business but may be related to 
any legitimate business objective, including bona fide attempts at improving 
its efficiency, profitability or competitiveness". Furthermore, the fact that the 
measure was the last available resort needs to be demonstrated by the 
employer, which needs to show that all alternative steps had been 
considered to prevent retrenchments.80 
On the other hand, the dismissal of an employee because of his or her 
participation in a protected strike will be labelled as an "automatically unfair 
dismissal".81 In the same vein, section 67(4) of the LRA provides that "an 
employer may not dismiss an employee for participating in a protected 
strike". However, section 67(5) states that "it is lawful to dismiss a striking 
employee for reasons based on the employer's operational requirements" 
and section 77(3) provides that:  
A person who takes part in protest action or in any conduct in contemplation 
or in furtherance of protest action that complies with subsection (1), enjoys the 
protections conferred by section 67. 
                                            
employer must consult, (a) any person whom the employer is required to consult in 
terms of a collective agreement". 
74  See NUMSA v Dorbly Limited 2004 ZALC 47 (8 June 2004); Steenkamp v Edcon 
Limited 2016 ZACC 1 (22 January 2016). 
75  See s 189 of the LRA. 
76  SATAWU v G4S Aviation Secure Solutions 2016 ZALCJHB 10 (13 January 2016). 
77  Gandidze 2007 LDD 84. 
78  Gandidze 2007 LDD 83. 
79  Du Toit 2005 ILJ 595. Also see Gandidze 2007 LDD 95. 
80  See General Food Industries Ltd v Food Allied Workers Union 2004 25 ILJ 1260 
(LAC). 
81  See s 187(1)(a) of the LRA. 
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The court in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd82 was faced with a 
problem created by the LRA, in that section 67(4) read together with section 
187(1)(a) contradicts section 67(5), which does not prohibit an employer 
from fairly dismissing an employee for reasons based on an employer's 
operational requirements. The court then referred to the case of Johnson 
and Johnson v CWIU,83 which stated that a strike becomes counter-
productive if it threatens the very existence of the enterprise against which 
it is directed.84 However, the question still remains, does this not undermine 
the purpose of a strike and its intended consequences? 
The question to ask is how much economic hardship an employer is 
required to tolerate before it is entitled to retrench striking workers. It is trite 
that economic harm through industrial action is both expected and accepted 
by all parties involved in collective bargaining.85 The complex issue of the 
retrenchment of strikers involved in a legal strike is freighted with history.86 
However, the power of the employer to inflict "capital punishment" on the 
strikers who partake in a protected strike is constrained by the fact that such 
dismissals are categorised as automatically unfair.87 The vexed question 
that arises in each case is whether the employees were dismissed for 
participating in a protected strike or whether they were dismissed for the 
operational requirements of the employer. Where the reason for the 
dismissal is participation in a protected strike and not the employer's 
operational requirement, then the dismissal will be branded as automatically 
unfair in terms of section 187(1)(a). 
It is submitted that rather than contravening the safeguards in section 5(1) 
and (3), an employer confronted with a prolonged and crippling protected 
strike may resort to the dismissal of the strikers on the ground of operational 
requirements. For instance, in NUMSA v Dorbly Ltd88 the retrenched 
employees were taking part in a protected national strike. The Labour Court 
                                            
82  SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
83  Johnson and Johnson v CWIU 1998 12 BLLR 1209 (LAC). 
84  Johnson and Johnson v CWIU 1998 12 BLLR 1209 (LAC) 1726 B-C. 
85  MAN Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd and United Motor & Allied Workers Union 1991 12 
ILJ 181 (LC) 198H-I. 
86  See generally BAWU v Prestige Hotels CC t/ Blue Waters Hotel 1993 14 ILJ 963 
(LAC) 972F; Cobra Watertech v NUMSA 1995 16 ILJ 582 (LAC) 616F; NUMSA v 
Vetsak Co-operative 1996 17 ILJ 455 (A); NUM v Black Mountain Mineral 
Development Co (Pty) Ltd 1997 4 SA 51 (SCA). 
87  SACCAWU v Afrox Ltd 1999 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC) para 41. 
88  NUMSA v Dorbly Limited 2004 ZALC 47 (8 June 2004). Also see General Food 
Industries Ltd v FAWU 2004 25 ILJ 2135 (LAC); Early Bird (Pty) Ltd v FAWU 2004 
25 ILJ 2135 (LAC). And also Steenkamp v Edcon Limited 2016 ZACC 1 (22 January 
2016). 
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had to determine whether their retrenchment constituted a dismissal for 
operational requirements or whether it was automatically unfair in terms of 
section 187(1)(a). An important question concerned the extent to which an 
employer is expected to endure the harm occasioned by industrial action 
before it is permitted to effect a dismissal for operational reasons. On the 
facts, the court found the dismissals to have been genuinely grounded in 
operational requirements, but held that they were procedurally unfair 
because the employer took the decision to close down the operation prior 
to engaging in proper consultations with the union. 
At first glance, it would appear that an employer in a protected strike is 
statutorily emasculated. However, an employer can still invoke replacement 
labour to a limited extent for continuous production or to retain the legal 
power of dismissal. The employer can invoke operational requirements to 
dismiss employees engaged in a protected strike, although it is not that 
simple. Therefore, while the LRA provides important safeguards with regard 
to freedom of association, collective bargaining and striking, it does not 
entirely insulate protected strikers from dismissal. We cannot also lose sight 
of the fact that the underlying purpose of labour law is to serve as a 
countervailing force against the power of the employer. Otto Khan-
Freund's89 aphorism still carries force: "The relations between an employer 
and an isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between the 
bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power". Hence, preserving 
job security is one of the overarching objectives of the LRA and to the same 
extent the Constitution.90 In a nutshell, the vulnerability of those in 
employment is an abiding feature of the contemporary world of work. 
4.4  A declaratory order 
The court in Elements Six Productions deemed a declaratory order 
prohibiting the repetition of similar conduct to be appropriate.91 The court 
reasoned that "it would be neither competent nor appropriate for this court 
to grant any monetary relief in this case".92 The authors, however, disagree 
with this court's declaratory order as it is little more than a slap on the wrist 
for the employer. Although it was acceptable not to award damages, the 
courts could have considered compensation (no need to prove damages) 
for unfairly discriminating against the striking employees in terms of section 
                                            
89  Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 6. 
90  Sidumo v Rustenburg Mines Ltd 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) para 74. Also see Cheadle 
et al South African Constitutional Law 6. 
91  Elements Six Productions para 24. 
92  Elements Six Productions para 24. 
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158(1)(a)(vi) of the LRA, which reads: "The Labour Court may - (a) make 
any appropriate order, including – (vi) an award of damages in any 
circumstances contemplated in this Act." The authors argue that an order 
that the employer should pay compensation could possibly have a deterrent 
effect on employers who willy-nilly undermine collective bargaining in future. 
5  Conclusion 
Elements Six Productions demonstrates that if employers in a protected 
strike context are allowed to pay incentives, rewards or bonuses to non-
strikers and these rewards are benignly styled as "token of appreciation" for 
hard work, then there is a real danger that one of the core objectives of the 
LRA, namely promoting collective bargaining, may be defeated. In addition, 
incentivising non-strikers also impedes the speedy resolution of labour 
disputes.93 Being cognisant of the employer's need to meet the demands of 
its clients during the strike and to avoid the loss of market share, the authors 
understand that the employer had to increase the amount of overtime 
worked, for which non-strikers were remunerated. Strikes in South Africa 
are becoming more common and it cannot be gainsaid that this adversely 
affects the profitability of businesses and the economy at large. Inasmuch 
as the employer has the right to find means to keep its business afloat, we 
argue and maintain that the right to strike should not be undermined by the 
payment of an incentive innocently dressed as a token.  
It is beyond doubt that the payment of bonuses to non-striking employees 
unavoidably places strikers at a huge disadvantage, so NUMSA's 
complaints about the payment of bonuses to non-strikers makes sense. 
They have practical force and some ethical appeal. Rewarding non-strikers 
would affect or influence a union member's decision whether or not to strike 
in future. This is principally due to the fact that some strikers may feel that 
to strike is futile because the benefit of the strike is conferred also upon non-
strikers, and moreover the non-strikers get something "extra" if they work 
during the strike. The non-strikers may say that their decision not to strike 
is vindicated because firstly they get what the strikers wanted in any event, 
that is, a higher wage, and secondly, they receive additional remuneration 
in the form of overtime payment. Thirdly, they are rewarded for working 
during the strike, the reward taking the form of an additional payment. In 
                                            
93  NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 24 ILJ 305 (CC) paras 26, 65; Kim-Lin Fashions 
CC v Brunton 2001 22 ILJ 109 (LAC) paras 17-18; SA Breweries v CCMA 2002 23 
ILJ 1467 (LC) para 2. 
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short, there is no justification for giving rewards to non-strikers because they 
refrained from exercising their statutory right to strike. 
The approach adopted by the Elements Six Productions court to the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute cannot be faulted and 
the case, particularly when read in tandem with antecedent Labour Court 
decisions, sends an unmistakable message that retaliatory economic 
measures to defeat a protected strike will not be countenanced. The last 
word on this topic belongs very firmly to Arendse AJ: 
If employers, in a protected strike context, are allowed to pay incentives, 
rewards or bonuses to non-strikers albeit that they are dressed up as 
'innocent' rewards for 'hard work' then there is a very real danger that the Holy 
Cow called collective bargaining, may be undermined or compromised in the 
process. Indeed, in my view, in the context of a legal strike, payment of any 
reward, incentive, or bonus should be strictly prohibited. Such payment is 
unnecessarily provocative and fuels an adversarial approach to collective 
bargaining. 
Since the LRA is mute on whether an employer can respectfully request a 
non-striker to perform the work of a striker, the legislature should consider 
adopting a provision which explicitly prohibits an employer from engaging in 
such conduct. If such conduct persists in today’s labour environment, its 
effects would be that the strikers would be deterred from striking in future; 
conversely, non-strikers would be encouraged not to go on strike at all. More 
so, an offer of a reward to non-strikers perform work beyond their duty 
should be prohibited per se, as this is done with an ulterior motive. Instead 
of luring employees with a reward, employers still have the option of 
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